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Abstract
Evolutionary biological theories of group cooperation predict that (1) group members will tend to judge cooperative co-members
favorably, and freeriding co-members negatively and (2) members who themselves cooperate more frequently will be especially likely
to make these social judgments. An experiment tested these predictions among Shuar hunter-horticulturalists. Subjects viewed depic-
tions of pairs of workers who varied in the extent to which they had contributed to, and beneWted from, a team project. Subjects were
then asked to judge which worker deserved more respect, and which deserved more punishment. When judging between unequal-
contributors, all subjects tended to favor more cooperative (i.e., higher-contributing) workers. However, when judging between
equal-contributors/unequal-beneWters, male subjects who themselves often engaged in team cooperation tended to favor more coop-
erative (i.e., lower-beneWting) workers, while subjects who were female and who therefore rarely engaged in team cooperation tended
to favor less cooperative (i.e., higher-beneWting) workers.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
The freerider problem, social judgment, and human nature
In a collective action, individuals cooperate to pro-
duce some resource that they will share among them-
selves. Collective actions are common in human social
life (Ostrom, 1990), including in organizational con-
texts (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Goren, Kurzban, &
Rapoport, 2003): for example, members of a work team
who jointly design some new product, and whose
eVorts bring rewards to all team members. However,
collective actions must overcome some challenges in
order to succeed, and chief among these is the freerider
problem (Olson, 1965). If each member receives an
equal share of the beneWt that the group produces, no
matter how much that member contributed to the pro-
duction eVort, then each member has a private incen-
tive to contribute less than co-members. This incentive
to freeride exists because if all members beneWt equally,
then the members who contributed the least to produc-
tion will reap the highest net beneWts. More formally:
in a group of n members, one’s cost of contributing c
creates a public good, with a total beneWt mc that is
shared equally by all members. One can contribute pro-
ductively when 1 < m; however, if 1 < m < n, then one
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can proWt more individually if one fails to contribute,
and instead freerides on the contribution eVorts of co-
members.
So other things being equal, it would often seem
rational for a collective action participant to not con-
tribute at all, and to let co-participants do all the work.
But if all participants adopt this strategy, then nobody
in the collective action will cooperate, and the collec-
tive action will therefore fail. How are humans able to
overcome this dilemma? Research suggests that people
often solve freerider problems by directing social bene-
Wts towards cooperators, and/or by imposing social
costs on freeriders (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterl-
und, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Hawkes, 1993; Pat-
ton, 2000; Price, 2003, 2006; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby,
2002; Yamagishi, 1986). This distribution of social ben-
eWts and costs occurs because observers make positive
and negative social judgments about the behavior of
cooperators and freeriders, respectively: cooperators
are seen as virtuous and worthy of respect, reward, or
some other form of social beneWt, while freeriders are
seen as irresponsible and deserving of condemnation,
punishment, or some other form of social cost. These
beneWts and costs can be allocated either formally or
informally (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Price,
2006): for example, a cooperative team member may be
rewarded formally with a salary increase, or informally
with co-member respect; or, a freeriding member might
be punished formally by being Wred, or informally by
losing respect.
While this pattern of judging cooperators positively
and freeriders negatively has been well-documented in
industrialized societies, evidence for its cultural uni-
versality, especially from small-scale societies, is lack-
ing. If this pattern is universal, then it may reXect
something deeper than just the norms or preferences of
any particular culture, and could emanate from the
ways in which Homo sapiens is psychologically
adapted for cooperation in groups. It is reasonable to
suggest that the human mind is adapted for such coop-
eration, because ancestral humans could have gained
access to crucial Wtness-enhancing resources by partici-
pating in successful collective actions in the evolution-
ary past (Chagnon, 1997; Hawkes, 1993; Price et al.,
2002), for example in the contexts of group hunting
and foraging, warfare, intergroup trade and alliance-
building activities, predator defense, and shelter-build-
ing. Moreover, as will be explained below, the social
judgments that people make in collective action
contexts, at least in industrialized societies, are of a
form that suggests that they are the products of psy-
chological mechanisms that were shaped by natural
selection.
Some evidence about social judgment patterns in
small-scale societies does exist, and does tend to sup-
port the view that those observed in industrialized
societies are indeed universal (Erasmus, 1977;
Ostrom, 1990; Price, 2006). However, these accounts
are largely anecdotal, and there is a need for addi-
tional, quantitative evidence. The study presented in
this paper was primarily an eVort to produce such evi-
dence, by demonstrating that in a hunter-horticul-
tural society in the Ecuadorian Amazon, villagers
make negative judgments about freeriders and posi-
tive judgments about cooperators, just as they do in
industrialized societies.
The evolution of social judgment in collective actions
An evolutionary biological perspective on coopera-
tion suggests several categories of reasons why humans
should make negative judgments about freeriders, and
positive judgments about cooperators. Each category
will be discussed in turn.
Access to resources
Participation in cooperative interactions such as
collective actions would have been Wtness-enhancing
for ancestral humans, because it would have permitted
them to access resources that they could not
have acquired by acting alone (Alexander, 1979). The
more cooperative and productive one’s co-participants
were in an ancestral collective action, the more one
could have consumed the resources that they produced,
and the better it would have been for one’s Wtness.
Thus, a simple reason why ancestral humans
should have evolved to prefer cooperators over freerid-
ers is because this preference would have improved
their access to resources. From this perspective,
interactants in general (be they cooperators, freeriders,
or some other type) should prefer cooperators as
partners, because all types of interactants should ben-
eWt from having more productive co-interactants.
Experimental evidence does suggest that both coopera-
tors and freeriders prefer to interact with cooperators
(Ehrhart & Keser, 1999; Page, Putterman, & Unel,
2005).
Exploitation avoidance
In order for cooperation to evolve, the beneWts of
cooperation must be preferentially directed towards
cooperators, rather than towards freeriders. If
cooperators can thus harvest the beneWts of their labor
preferentially for themselves, then they can prevent
freeriders from gaining a Wtness advantage. And as
long as freeriders are not gaining this advantage, then
cooperators can avoid being exploited and
outcompeted by freeriders, and collective action can
therefore evolve. There are two main ways in which this
exploitation avoidance can occur. First, it can occur
via positive assortment, if cooperators assort into
cooperative interactions with other cooperators.
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Among non-kin1, positive assortment among coopera-
tors may result if cooperators recognize, and interact
preferentially with, other cooperators by virtue of some
observable, diYcult-to-fake phenotypic trait (“green-
beard”) displayed by all cooperators (Dawkins, 1976;
Hamilton, 1964). An obvious candidate for such a trait
would be engagement in cooperative behavior itself
(Dawkins, 1976; Price, 2006). Second, exploitation
avoidance can occur via reciprocal altruism, if interac-
tants cooperate only to the extent that they observe co-
interactants to cooperate (Trivers, 1971). For example,
A acts cooperatively towards B at Wrst, and then con-
tinues to cooperate only as long B reciprocates this
cooperativeness; if B fails to reciprocate, A terminates
the interaction, but if B reciprocates, then A and B pro-
ceed to engage in a mutually beneWcial exchange rela-
tionship, for as long as both continue to reciprocate
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
Positive assortment and reciprocal altruism need not
be mutually exclusive, and can in fact interact synergisti-
cally to promote the evolution of collective action, if
reciprocators assort positively with other reciprocators
(Boyd & Richerson, 1988). Cross-cultural evidence from
real-life and experimental collective actions conWrms the
predictions of both positive assortment and reciprocal
altruism, which implies that both processes were impor-
tant in enabling collective action to evolve (Page et al.,
2005; Price, 2006; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006).
From the perspectives of positive assortment and recip-
rocal altruism, only cooperators (and not freeriders) are
expected to interact preferentially with cooperators,
because only cooperators face the problem of avoiding
exploitation by freeriders.
Partner motivation
Because collective action participants beneWt from
having productive co-participants, they may make nega-
tive and positive social judgments, and engage in associ-
ated behaviors such as punishment and reward, in order
to motivate increased partner contributions (Boyd, Gin-
tis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Price et al., 2002). Exper-
imental economic data suggest that monetary
punishment alone is eVective in promoting cooperation
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner,
1992; Yamagishi, 1986), and that a combination of mon-
etary punishment and reward is especially eVective
(Andreoni et al., 2003; Sefton, Shupp, &Walker, under
review); further, informal reward in the form of social
status appears to elicit cooperation in ‘real life’ interac-
tions (Chagnon, 1988; Price, 2003, 2006). From the per-
spective of partner motivation, negative judgments of
freeriders should be made mainly by cooperators,
because freeriders should want to avoid advocating their
own punishment; data do suggest that cooperators are
more likely to judge freeriders negatively (Fehr & Gäch-
ter, 2002; Price, 2005; Price et al., 2002; Shinada, Yamag-
ishi, & Ohmura, 2004). However, freeriders and
cooperators should both advocate the reward of cooper-
ators, since both can improve their access to resources by
having productive co-interactants; consistent with this
expectation, survey data suggest that the extent of one’s
self-interest in group production is positively correlated
with the extent of one’s support of contributor reward
(Price et al., 2002).
Reduction of freerider advantage
Negative judgments and punishments directed at free-
riders might be eVorts not to coerce them into contribut-
ing, but rather to harm them, and thereby reduce their
advantage (Price et al., 2002; see also Fehr & Schmidt,
1999). From this perspective, negative judgments of free-
riders should be made mainly by cooperators, because it is
cooperators who will be disadvantaged relative to freerid-
ers. As noted above, evidence does suggest that people
who cooperate more are more punitive towards freeriders.
In summary, evolutionary theory gives several rea-
sons to expect that social judgments about cooperators
and freeriders should be positive and negative, respec-
tively. However, only two of the reasons listed above
assume that freeriders and cooperators should both be
likely to make these judgments. These reasons are that
both cooperators and freeriders can access more
resources (1) by preferring to interact with cooperators,
and (2) if their co-interactants are motivated to cooper-
ate via reward. Every other reason named above
assumes that cooperators should be more likely than
freeriders to make these judgments. These reasons are
that (1) cooperators alone have an additional incentive
(beyond resource access) to prefer to interact with coop-
erators, in that only they face the problem of avoiding
exploitation; and, that cooperators should be relatively
interested in using punishment in order to (2) coerce
freeriders into contributing, and to (3) reduce the free-
rider advantage. Therefore, while cooperators and free-
riders share some reasons for making the expected social
judgments, cooperators have some additional reasons of
their own for making these judgments.
How are cooperators and freeriders identiWed?
In order to make positive and negative social judg-
ments about cooperators and freeriders, respectively,
one must have some criteria for identifying cooperators
and freeriders. In industrialized societies, there appear to
1 In many species, positive assortment results from individuals inter-
acting preferentially with their close genetic kin, because close kin are
relatively likely to carry the same gene(s) for cooperation. This process
of “kin selection” is the reason why in many species, cooperation is
much more common among close kin than among non-kin (Hamilton,
1964). However, cross-culturally, collective actions often involve par-
ticipants who are not close kin, so kin selection does not provide an ad-
equate explanation for the evolution of collective action.
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be three basic aspects of such identiWcation: the extent to
which the individual (1) contributed in the interaction,
(2) beneWted from the interaction, and (3) acted
intentionally.
Contribution
This criterion appears to be of primary importance,
and is the best studied of the three. Many recent studies
of psychological and behavioral reactions to cooperators
and freeriders have involved experimental collective
actions known as public good games. Subjects in these
games are assigned to groups, typically consisting of
four or more members, and are given an equal endow-
ment of tokens, redeemable for real cash at the end of
the experiment. Subjects then have the opportunity to
contribute any amount of this money to a group
account. The experimenter multiplies these contributions
by some factor >1 in order to produce a public good,
and then redistributes this good equally among all mem-
bers. Subjects are given no information about co-mem-
bers other than co-members’ contribution amounts, and
they are often given the opportunity to punish (and
sometimes, reward) co-members. Thus, subjects are
expected to judge co-member behavior exclusively on
the basis of contribution level. These studies do suggest
that lower contributors receive more negative judgment
and punishment. SpeciWcally, they suggest that X will
more likely be punished, the more X’s contribution devi-
ates negatively from the group average contribution
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, &
Villeval, 2003), or from the contribution of the punishing
individual (Falk et al., 2005; Masclet et al., 2003).
BeneWt
In public good game studies, extent of beneWt has
received less attention than extent of contribution. How-
ever, it has been the focus of a series of highly inXuential
experiments showing that people are signiWcantly better
at solving a logic problem (the Wason selection task),
when the problem is expressed in terms of detecting a
cheater on a social contract having the abstract form “if
you take the beneWt, then you must pay the cost” (Cos-
mides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992). These
results suggest that cheater-detection is enabled by a
psychological system that is functionally specialized for
detecting cheaters who have taken the beneWt without
paying the cost. This interpretation has been supported
in subsequent studies, that have, for example, replicated
this Wnding in a small-scale society (Sugiyama, Tooby, &
Cosmides, 2002); reported a selective impairment of the
cheater-detection ability in a brain-damaged subject
(Stone, Cosmides, Tooby, Kroll, & Knight, 2002); and
demonstrated the neural domain-speciWcity of the
cheater-detection system via fMRI (Fiddick, Spampi-
nato, & Grafman, 2005). Assessment of beneWt thus
appears to be an important aspect of how the mind is
adapted for cheater-detection. This attention to beneWt
probably reXects the fact that in order to cheat or free-
ride, one must beneWt from the interaction; and more
generally, one’s beneWt-to-contribution ratio determines
where one falls on the continuum from narrowly
self-interested freerider (high ratio), to self-sacriWcing,
altruistic cooperator (low ratio).
Intentionality
Intent appears to be a third important aspect of assess-
ing cooperativeness. Non-contribution in a cooperative
interaction can be intentional (e.g., skipping work to lie
by the pool) or accidental (e.g., missing work due to
unavoidable injury). Cross-cultural evidence suggests
that only intentional non-cooperation counts as cheating
or freeriding (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan,
2002; Delton, 2005; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 1999;
Price, 2005, 2006; Rabin, 1993; Singer, Kiebel, Winston,
Dolan, & Frith, 2004). Consideration of intentionality
would make sense if a goal of punishment were to coerce
contributions from freeriders, because punishment eVort
would be wasted on those unable to contribute. It would
also make sense if people strive to associate with cooper-
ators and to avoid freeriders, because only intentional
non-cooperation is evidence of a non-cooperative dispo-
sition. While intent does appear to be an important
aspect of assessing cooperativeness, the present study
focused more on how people use information about con-
tribution and beneWt in making this assessment. (How-
ever as discussed below, even before beginning the study,
it was clear that members of the study population do con-
sider intent when making social judgments).
The Shuar
The study presented below was conducted in two
neighboring Shuar hunter-horticulturalist villages, one
of about 300 residents and the other of about 80, located
in the Ecuadorian province of Morona Santiago. The
Shuar belong to a linguistic population called the Jívaro,
and are perhaps best-known for their tradition of
shrinking the heads of their enemies (Harner, 1972).
Along with other Jívaro groups, they are also well-
known for having one of the most violent societies on
the anthropological record, with historic male death
rates from homicide of about 50% (Patton, 2005). Due to
the pacifying inXuence of missionaries and modern legal
systems, the head-shrinking tradition had disappeared
by the 1960s, and the level of violent conXict in general
has been much reduced over the past several decades
(Steel, 1999). However, residents of the study villages
sometimes do employ violence as a means of dispute res-
olution, for example, at the time of the study, an elderly
woman had recently been murdered with a machete, the
victim of an ongoing feud between two within-village
lineages. The villages lack any formalized institution for
resolving disputes, and police forces of the larger
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Ecuadorian society are often reluctant to intervene in
Shuar conXicts, unless the violence gets seriously out of
hand. Village aVairs are administered by a democrati-
cally-elected government consisting of a president, vice-
president, secretary and treasurer, and one’s social
standing is greatly inXuenced by the extent to which one
is perceived to act in ways that beneWt the village (Price,
2003). Many of the most respected residents are those
who are perceived to have served the community well in
one or more of these elected oYces. These residents
appear to beneWt from being respected in various ways,
for example, they are able to maintain positions of polit-
ical power and social inXuence, and they tend to have
more oVspring, and healthier daughters (Hagen, Barrett,
& Price, 2006).
Like most modern small-scale societies, the study vil-
lages are at a stage of cultural transition in which they
retain many of their traditional practices, while at the
same time embracing some newer ones from the larger
industrialist society. Many traditional Shuar practices
are typical of Amazonian hunter-horticulturalists in gen-
eral. They rely heavily on their crops of plantains and
sweet manioc for food, but they supplement this diet by
hunting jungle game. They maintain a traditional divi-
sion of labor by sex, which has men doing the hunting
and the more demanding physical labor such as shelter
construction, and has women focusing on cultivating
and processing garden products, and on caring for chil-
dren. The Shuar generally speak their native tongue
(Shuar) with one another, and the level of genetic relat-
edness among village residents is high by western stan-
dards. In the village of 300, for example, the majority of
residents are closely related descendents of two brothers
who helped found the village. Analyses of a genealogy of
six generations2 of village residents, using Kindemcom
(Chagnon & Bryant, 1984) and Kinsanity (Hagen, 2003)
software, revealed the average resident to be a genetic
relative of 47% of the other 299 current residents, and to
have an average coeYcient of relatedness of 0.045 with
all other residents (for reference, the coeYcient of relat-
edness is 0.50 for full siblings, 0.125 for Wrst cousins, and
0.031 for second cousins). Many more modern Shuar
practices are also typical of transitional Amazonian
small-scale societies: timber sales are an important
source of cash, and cash cropping is of limited but
increasing importance; villages have had contact with
missionaries (in this case, Protestant) for several decades,
and most residents under the age of 60 can speak some
Spanish in addition to Shuar.
Shuar mingas
The Shuar regularly practice traditional collective
actions known as mingas. A minga involves a work team
that cooperates in order to accomplish some common
goal, for example clearing a Weld with machetes, or
building a house. Little has been published about the ori-
gin and history of mingas, but by all accounts, including
those of older informants who are most knowledgeable
about traditional Shuar culture, they are a fairly ancient
practice, among both Shuar and surrounding Andean/
Amazonian groups (Aguirre, 1952). The physical labor
in mingas is primarily a male activity, although there are
occasional exceptions to this rule (e.g., see below discus-
sion of the female association member). However,
women do contribute by preparing and distributing the
chicha that men consume during breaks in the minga.
(Chicha is a traditional, mildly-alcoholic drink, usually
made of fermented, masticated yucca. The opportunity
to consume chicha is the highlight of minga participa-
tion for many men). Mingas are of three general types:
(1) general mingas, in which “citizens” (socios) in a
village are expected to participate; (2) family mingas, in
which invited family members are expected to
participate; and (3) association mingas, in which all
members of a within-village association are expected to
participate.
Family mingas are the most informal kind of the
three; these occur relatively spontaneously, and involve
close family members working to improve some aspect
of their private property, for example, “cleaning” fam-
ily gardens (i.e., using machetes to hack down thick,
intrusive jungle weeds), or adding a room to a home.
The Shuar will typically invite several close relatives
such as siblings and Wrst cousins to their family mingas,
and invitations are usually accepted. Unlike in the case
of general and association mingas, absences from fam-
ily mingas are not formally punished. General mingas
are more formal aVairs, and are organized by the vil-
lage president, for public-good-enhancing tasks such as
“cleaning” public spaces or making repairs on school
buildings. General mingas last an entire workday, and
attendance is taken by the village secretary in order to
keep a record of how much residents owe in Wnes for
nonattendance. For each minga, members are marked
as either “present” (presente), “unjustiWably absent”
(falta) or “justiWably absent” (justiWcado). A falta
occurs when an absent member is perceived as having
been capable of attending, and it is punished with a
monetary Wne. A justiWcado occurs when the absence is
perceived as having been due to some unavoidable,
incapacitating sickness or injury, and it is not Wned.
Thus, an absence’s excusability depends on whether it
is considered to have been intentional, and as in indus-
trialized societies, accidental non-cooperativeness is
not considered freeriding (Price, 2006). The president is
responsible for collecting Wnes for faltas: at village
meetings held every few weeks, the president reads
aloud the names of Wned members, who are expected to
then come forward to pay their debts. Paid Wnes are2 Much of these genealogical data were collected by Clark Barrett.
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deposited into a village account, for public expendi-
tures such as school supplies, public building materials,
and so forth.
Associations that hold mingas are groups of villagers
who are united in the pursuit of an economic goal that
requires a long-term cooperative eVort. These associa-
tions assemble informally, and membership is open to
adult villagers who are willing to put in the signiWcant
work hours that membership requires. Only one associa-
tion existed in the two study villages at the time of study,
a group of 13 cañicultores (sugarcane cultivators) who
would hold mingas once or twice weekly, usually to clean
their Welds of the dense, rapidly-growing weeds that con-
stantly threatened their crop. The cañicultores’ goal was
to produce sugar that they could sell in regional towns,
and each member stood to gain an equal share of what-
ever proWts the association could make. The cañicultores
association had a democratically-elected president and
secretary, and, analogously to how mingas occurred at
the village level, the president organized their mingas,
while their secretary kept attendance records so that Wnes
could be collected for perceived intentional absences. The
cañicultores association had one female member, the wife
of the association president. Although it was unusual for
female Shuar to participate in the primary physical labor
of mingas, this woman would help with this work for at
least some portion of most mingas. However, she also
carried out the more traditional female role of preparing
and distributing chicha to the other cañicultores.
The home village of the majority of study subjects held
about 10 general mingas annually, according to the village
secretary’s records. Men in this village also reported par-
ticipating in an average of 8 family mingas annually.3
These are the only two kinds of mingas that most Shuar
men participated in, so the typical Shuar man participated
in no more than about 18 mingas a year, or 1.5 per month.
However, the 13 members of the cañicultores association
participated in many additional mingas. According to
association records, the cañicultores held 60 mingas
between July 2000 and December 2001, an average of 3.3
per month (this study was conducted in the summer of
2002). Thus, over this period, the cañicultores had many
extra minga opportunities, in addition to the 1.5 monthly
opportunities that they shared with typical men.
The experiment
The goal of the experiment was to test predictions
derived from the evolutionary theoretical considerations
discussed above, by measuring subjects’ judgments about
cooperators and freeriders in a hypothetical minga. Spe-
ciWcally, the experiment focused on whether subjects
judged higher-contributing workers more positively, and
higher-beneWting workers more negatively (when con-
trolling for worker contribution level). The experiment
also investigated whether subjects who cooperated more,
that is, who participated in more mingas, were especially
likely to make the expected social judgments.
Previous studies (Price, 2003, 2005, 2006) also exam-
ined Shuar social judgments, but the present study diVers
from this earlier work in several signiWcant ways: it relies
on experimental rather than real-world data; it examines
whether the extent of a worker’s beneWt impacts the judg-
ments that are made about that worker, and whether sub-
jects who cooperate more are more likely to make the
expected social judgments; and, it involves a signiWcantly
larger subject population, and one that includes many
females. Other recent research on cooperation in small-
scale societies has focused on behavior in experimental
economic games (Henrich et al., 2001, 2004), and one
might question why the below study did not use an exper-
imental collective action such as a public good game.
There were three main reasons. First, the study focused on
social judgments themselves, while economic games tend
to focus on the behavior that results from these judgments
(e.g., the imposition of punishment). Second, a study goal
was to measure judgments about workers who beneWted
unequally from a semi-public good, and no standard
experimental game allows subjects to beneWt unequally in
this way. Third, the unusual features of public good
games, such as their formality, subject anonymity, and
their basic premise that a public good can be produced
out of thin air at the whim of the experimenter, might
have confused subjects. The Shuar are unfamiliar with
experiments in general, and an eVort was made to design
one that included recognizable elements, such as the
minga, so that their responses would be as natural and
informative as possible. The minga scenario that was used,
which involved a work team constructing a system of
pipes for the delivery of running water to village homes,
was chosen because of its realistic aspects. Several Shuar
villages have held mingas for the construction of such pipe
systems, and informants from the study villages suggested
that subjects would consider this scenario to be plausible.
The following hypotheses, derived from the theory
discussed above, were tested:
1. Subjects will tend to make “pro-cooperation” judg-
ments; in other words:
1a. When judging between unequally-contributing
workers, subjects will tend to judge higher con-
tributors more favorably.
1b. When judging between equally-contributing but
unequally-beneWting workers, subjects will tend
to judge higher beneWters less favorably.
2. The more frequently a subject participates in mingas,
the more that subject will tend to make these pro-
cooperation judgments.
3 Data about family minga frequency were collected by Weld col-
leagues Clark Barrett and Kevin Haley, for the Cross Cultural Games
Project (PIs: Joe Henrich and Jean Ensminger).
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Method
Subjects
These were 93 were adult residents of, or visitors to,
one of two Shuar villages located several miles apart.
56% were male, and ages ranged from 18 to 59
(M D 31.71; age determination method is described
below). An eVort was made to collect data from all men
and women over the age of 18 in these villages. Potential
subjects were approached in public spaces (e.g., at the
community soccer Weld) or in their homes. A large
majority of villagers who were asked to participate in the
experiment agreed to do so. Older subjects tended to be
male, because older Shuar females tend to be less outgo-
ing than their male counterparts, and were therefore less
likely to be present in the public spaces where subject
recruitment took place.
Experimental design and procedures
Subjects were read a vignette (reprinted in English in
the Appendix A; subjects were read a Spanish transla-
tion) that described a village, located alongside a river,
that held a minga to construct a pipe system for bringing
running water from the river to village homes. However,
there were only enough pipes to reach the one-half of
homes in the village that were closer to the river. Sub-
jects were shown a diagram depicting this scenario
(Fig. 1), and were told that although this minga had
required a full day’s labor from all village men, some had
worked more than others. Subjects were then shown
cards depicting minga workers (Fig. 2), each of whom
varied in how much he had worked in the minga, and
how much he had beneWted from the minga (i.e., whether
he lived close to or far from the river). Degree of work
was depicted by a circle that was either 3/4 full and
accompanied by the number 9 (indicating nine hours of
work), or 1/4 full and accompanied by the number 3
(indicating three hours of work). Degree of beneWt was
depicted by a bucket of water that was either almost full
(high beneWt) or almost empty (low beneWt). All possible
combinations of degree of work and degree of beneWt
produced four worker types: (1) Low beneWt/low work,
(2) High beneWt/high work, (3) High beneWt/low work,
and (4) Low beneWt/high work. Note that High beneWt/
low work would be considered a highly uncooperative
freerider in industrialized societies, and Low beneWt/high
work a highly cooperative altruist; for clarity, these two
workers will hereafter be referred to as Freerider and
Altruist.
After the meanings of the symbols on the worker
cards had been explained to subjects, subjects were
asked to describe, to the experimenter, the meanings of
the symbols on one or more diVerent worker cards,
until it became clear that these symbols were under-
stood. The experiment then proceeded to the Respect
Question Period. In this period, subjects were shown, in
random consecutive order, each of the six possible
paired combinations of the four workers: Low beneWt/
low work versus Altruist, Freerider versus High ben-
eWt/high work, Low beneWt/low work versus High ben-
eWt/high work, Freerider versus Altruist, Freerider
versus Low beneWt/low work, and High beneWt/high
work versus Altruist. As subjects were presented with
each pair, they were asked (in Spanish), “Which one of
these people deserves more respect, based on his partic-
ipation in the minga?” After this question had been
answered for all six pairs, the experiment continued to
the Punish Question Period. Subjects were again shown
all six pairs in random consecutive order, and were this
time asked, “If you were the leader of this community,
and you could decide whether community members
should be punished based on their participation in the
minga, which of these people would you think should
be punished more?” To both of these questions, sub-
jects could respond that they would respect/punish one
worker more than the other, or that they could not
decide (i.e. they would respect/punish neither, or
respect/punish both equally).
Fig. 1. Diagram of water system. Depicts the result of a minga for
delivering running water from a river to village homes. There were
only enough pipes to reach homes that were closer to the river, so the
minga beneWted only half of the villagers.
Fig. 2. Minga worker cards. Symbols represent degree of contribution
to minga (3/4 full circle and “9” D high contributor, 1/4 full circle and
“3” D low contributor), and degree of beneWt from minga (full
bucket D high beneWt, empty bucket D low beneWt). From left to right:
Low beneWt/low work, High beneWt/high work, High beneWt/low work
(“Freerider”), Low beneWt/high work (“Altruist”).
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Each of the six worker pairs presented to subjects was
regarded as a separate variable, with values determined
as follows: if the more cooperative worker in the pair
(i.e., the higher contributor from a pair of unequal-
contributors, or the lower beneWter from a pair of equal
contributors) was judged more favorably (i.e., respected
more or punished less), then the value was 1.0; if the less
cooperative worker was favored, the value was 0.0; and
if no decision was reached, the value was 0.5. Because all
six pairs were presented in both the Respect and Punish
Question Periods, a total of twelve variables was created
in this way. By summing these variables, a composite
variable called Pro-cooperation was produced. Pro-
cooperation was designed to indicate the extent, on a
scale of 0–12, to which the subject favored the more
cooperative worker, in all pairs presented across the
entire experiment.
Three independent variables were measured. Two of
these were Sex and Age. Age was determined by
referencing each member’s state-issued ID card or birth
certiWcate. If these sources were unavailable, members’
self-reported ages were recorded, then cross-checked by
comparing them to ages of other individuals (e.g., sib-
lings) whose ages were known, and interpolating based
on birth order. The third independent variable, Partici-
pation, indicated how frequently the subject participated
in mingas. As discussed above, subjects fell cleanly into
three categories of participation frequency, and category
assignments were determined as follows. Because men
who belonged to the cañicultores association partici-
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and Spearman correlations for Pro-cooperation, its component items, and Participation
¤ p < .05.
¤¤ p < .01.
Variable M s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Respected more
1. Low beneWt/low work
vs. Altruist
0.95 0.20 — — — — — — — — — — — — —
2. Freerider vs. High beneWt/
high work
0.92 0.27 0.35¤¤ — — — — — — — — — — — —
3. Low beneWt/low work vs. 
High beneWt/high work
0.94 0.24 0.25¤ 0.36¤¤ — — — — — — — — — — —
4. Freerider vs. Altruist 0.88 0.33 0.02 0.58¤¤ 0.14 — — — — — — — — — —
5. Freerider vs. Low beneWt/low 
work
0.40 0.42 ¡0.03 0.16 ¡0.06 0.30¤¤ — — — — — — — — —
6. High beneWt/high work vs. 
Altruist
0.38 0.41 ¡0.15 0.06 ¡0.31¤¤ 0.25¤ 0.65¤¤ — — — — — — — —
Punished less
7. Low beneWt/low work vs. 
Altruist
0.91 0.28 0.16 0.26¤ 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.16 — — — — — — —
8. Freerider vs. High beneWt/
high work
0.94 0.23 0.24¤ 0.07 0.10 ¡0.10 ¡0.02 0.03 0.63¤¤ — — — — — —
9. Low beneWt/low work vs. 
High beneWt/high work
0.85 0.32 0.28¤¤ 0.26¤ 0.15 0.07 0.01 ¡0.10 0.37¤¤ 0.21¤ — — — — —
10. Freerider vs. Altruist 0.85 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.47¤¤ 0.23¤ 0.21¤ 0.34¤¤ 0.14 0.11 — — — —
11. Freerider vs. Low beneWt/low 
work
0.55 0.41 0.05 0.18 ¡0.01 0.25¤ 0.49¤¤ 0.40¤¤ 0.17 0.04 ¡0.07 0.46¤¤ — — —
12. High beneWt/high work vs.  
Altruist
0.40 0.36 ¡0.18 0.10 ¡0.14 0.18 0.45¤¤ 0.43¤¤ 0.07 0.06 ¡0.15 0.33¤¤ 0.66¤¤ — —
13. Pro-cooperation 8.96 2.00 0.17 0.44¤¤ 0.12 0.49¤¤ 0.73¤¤ 0.63¤¤ 0.44¤¤ 0.29¤¤ 0.19 0.57¤¤ 0.71¤¤ 0.65¤¤ —
14. Participation 1.68 0.68 ¡0.04 0.14 ¡0.08 0.25¤ 0.61¤¤ 0.47¤¤ 0.02 0.06 ¡0.15 0.15 0.40¤¤ 0.46¤¤ 0.55¤¤
Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and Spearman correlations for pro-cooperation and predictor variables
¤ p < .05.
¤¤ p < .01.
Variable M s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Pro-cooperation 8.96 2.00 — — — — — —
2. Pro-cooperation-contribution 7.23 1.29 0.60¤¤ — — — — —
3. Pro-cooperation-beneWt 1.73 1.27 0.86¤¤ 0.18 — — — —
4. Age 31.71 9.82 0.20 0.11 0.16 — — —
5. Sex 1.56 0.50 0.47¤¤ 0.07 0.56¤¤ 0.22¤ — —
6. Participation 1.68 0.68 0.55¤¤ 0.11 0.62¤¤ 0.30¤¤ 0.95¤¤ —
7. Participation-males 2.21 0.41 0.48¤¤ 0.18 0.42¤¤ 0.36¤¤ — —
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pated in many more mingas than typical men (4.8 versus
1.5 mingas per month), all available cañicultor subjects
were classiWed as high participation (N D 11; Participa-
tion value D 3). Other male subjects were classiWed as
medium participation (N D 41; Participation value D 2),
and, because mingas are almost exclusively a male activ-
ity, all female subjects were classiWed as low participa-
tion (N D 41; Participation value D 1). The one female
who participated often in mingas, the wife of the associa-
tion president (described above), was considered unclas-
siWable because although she was a primary participant
in many association mingas, she was not a primary par-
ticipant in other kinds of mingas. As the only subject
who did not Wt cleanly into any of the three Participation
categories, she was omitted from this study population.
Her inclusion would not have had signiWcant eVects on
the results presented below.4
Results
Variables 1–12 in Table 1 represent worker pairs pre-
sented in the Respect Question Period (variables 1–6)
and Punish Question Period (variables 7–12). (Subjects
who said that a worker should be respected more were
also more likely to say that that worker should be pun-
ished less).5 For these variables, a mean closer to 1.0 indi-
cates that the more cooperative worker in that pair was
more often favored. The composite variable Pro-cooper-
ation was created by summing variables 1–12, and indi-
cates subjects’ overall likelihood of favoring
cooperators. Pro-cooperation was normally distributed
(K-S test, p D .10; all p values are 2-tailed) and had mod-
erately high internal consistency (D 0.75), and its mean
of 8.96 (on a scale of 0 to 12) indicates that across the
entire experiment, subjects were about 75% likely to
favor the more cooperative worker.
However, subjects clearly favored cooperators only
when judging between unequal-contributors, and not
when judging between equal-contributors/unequal-
beneWters. While the means of variables 1–4 and 7–10 in
Table 1 (which represent pairs of unequal-contributors)
were all at least 0.85, the means of variables 5–6 and
11–12 (which represent pairs of equal-contributors/
unequal-beneWters) were all in the range of 0.38–0.55.
Fig. 3 illustrates that when judging between unequal
contributors, most subjects favored the higher contribu-
tor, while few favored the lower contributor, and few
were unable to decide. Fig. 4 shows that when judging
between equal-contributors/unequal-beneWters, many
subjects favored the higher beneWter, many favored the
lower beneWter, and many were unable to decide.
Did Age, Sex or Participation explain any variance in
social judgments? Table 2 suggests positive relation-
ships between Pro-cooperation and Age (rs D .20,
4 How would the inclusion of this unclassiWable subject have aVected
the results? When judging between unequal-contributors, she, consistent
with the large majority of all subjects, favored the higher-contributor
in most (7 of 8) instances. When judging between equal-contributors,
she favored the higher-beneWting (i.e., less cooperative) worker in 1 of 4
instances, and was unable to judge (tied) in 3 instances. Thus, when
judging between equal-contributors, she did not display an unambigu-
ously negative view of higher-cooperators (unlike many other female
subjects), but nor did she display an unambiguously positive view of
higher-cooperators (unlike many other cañicultores). Had her respons-
es been included, they would not have altered any Table 1 mean or s.d.
for variables 1–13 by more than .01, or any Table 1 correlation by
more than .04, and no correlation would have gone from being signiW-
cant to nonsigniWcant or vice-versa. Had she been classiWed as medium
participation, her responses would not have altered any Table 2 mean
or s.d. for variables 1–7 by more than .01, or any Table 2 correlation by
more than .02, and no correlation would have gone from being signiW-
cant to nonsigniWcant or vice-versa. Had she been classiWed as high
participation, her responses would not have altered any Table 2 mean
or s.d. for variables 1–7 by more than .02, or any Table 2 correlation by
more than .05, and no correlation would have gone from being signiW-
cant to nonsigniWcant or vice-versa.
5 Judgments about a worker in the Respect Question Period (i.e., the
sum of variables 1–6) were positively correlated with judgments about
that worker in the Punish Question Period (i.e., the sum of variables 7–
12) (rs D .58, p < .01). This correlation was not signiWcantly aVected by
interaction eVects with Sex or Age.
Fig. 3. Unequal contribution, equal or unequal beneWt. When judging
between two minga workers who had contributed unequally, a large
majority of subjects favored the higher contributor. The extent to
which a worker beneWted had little impact on judgments.
Fig. 4. Equal contribution, unequal beneWt. When judging between
two workers who had contributed equally and beneWted unequally, the
rationale for judgments was less clear than it had been for judgments
of unequal-contributors, and subjects had more diYculty deciding.
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p D .05), Sex (rs D .47, p < .01) and Participation (rs D .55,
p < .01). However, linear regression of Pro-cooperation
on Sex, Age and Participation revealed that Participa-
tion alone explained signiWcant unique variance in Pro-
cooperation (partial r D .28, p < .01). Age failed to
explain unique variance (partial r D .08, p D .46) because
it correlated with both of the other two predictor vari-
ables. Age correlated positively with Sex (rs D .22,
p < .05) because older men were more likely than older
women to be present during subject recruitment (dis-
cussed above). The correlation of Age with Participa-
tion (rs D .30, p < .01) reXects not only this Age-Sex
correlation (because Participation score was heavily
dependent on Sex), but also the fact that the mean age
of cañicultores (40.27) was higher than that of non-cañi-
cultores (30.56), and older subjects were therefore more
likely to be coded as high-participation. For these rea-
sons, the nearly-signiWcant correlation between Age and
Pro-cooperation seemed best explained as a by-product
of the correlations between Age and the other two pre-
dictor variables, and therefore Age was omitted from
further analysis. With Age omitted from the model,
Participation continued to explain unique variance in
Pro-cooperation (partial r D .31, p < .01), while Sex con-
tinued to explain none (partial r D .09, p D .41). Sex
failed as a predictor here because it was so highly corre-
lated with Participation (rs D .95, p < .01); as discussed
above, all female subjects and no male subjects were
classiWed as low-participation, because the primary
labor of mingas is almost exclusively a male activity.
The failure of Sex to explain unique variance in Pro-
cooperation indicated not that variance in Pro-coopera-
tion was unrelated to sex diVerences, but rather that all
of the predictive power of Sex was captured by the way
in which Participation was coded. However, the fact
that Participation explained variance in Pro-coopera-
tion, beyond that explained by Sex, suggested that Par-
ticipation had an important predictive component that
Sex did not share (more on this topic below).
Although Participation explained variance in Pro-
cooperation, it was signiWcantly positively correlated
(p < .05) with only one out of Pro-cooperation’s eight
component items which represented pairs of unequal-
contributors, but was highly positively correlated
(p < .01) with each of Pro-cooperation’s four component
items which represented pairs of equal-contributors/
unequal-beneWters. To further investigate this asymme-
try, Pro-cooperation was divided into two new compos-
ite variables: Pro-cooperation-contribution, which
summed the values of the unequal contributor items
(D 0.71), and Pro-cooperation-beneWt, which summed
the values of the equal contributor/unequal beneWter
items (D 0.81). As Table 2 shows, Participation was
signiWcantly positively correlated with Pro-cooperation-
beneWt (rs D .62, p < .01), but not with Pro-cooperation-
contribution (rs D .11, p D .29). Therefore, compared to
lower-participation subjects, higher-participation sub-
jects were more likely to favor workers who beneWted
less but contributed equally, but were not more likely to
favor workers who contributed more (because all sub-
jects, regardless of Participation category, overwhelm-
ingly favored higher-contributors).
Because Participation was so dependent on sex, the
high correlation between Participation and Pro-coopera-
tion-beneWt might actually have been more related to sex
than to minga participation. In order to control for sex,
low-participation subjects (ND41, all female) were omit-
ted from the analysis, and only males (ND52) were
included, thus allowing for a direct comparison between
medium- and high-participation males; the Participation
variable used for this analysis will be referred to as Partic-
ipation-males. Correlations between Participation-males
and the three pro-cooperation measures were analyzed,
and results (Table 2) were largely consistent with the anal-
ysis that had included females: Participation-males was
positively correlated with Pro-cooperation (rs D .48,
p< .01) and Pro-cooperation-beneWt (rs D .42, p < .01), but
not with Pro-cooperation-contribution (rs D .18, pD .19).
Table 3
Judgments (by minga participation category) about Freerider versus low beneWt/low work
Minga participation category Favored Freerider Favored low beneWt/low work Tied (could not decide)
Respected more Punished less Respected more Punished less Respect Punish
High 1/11 (9%) 0/11 (0%) 10/11 (91%) 8/11 (73%) 0/11 (0%) 3/11 (27%)
Medium 12/41 (29%) 9/41 (22%) 14/41 (34%) 20/41 (49%) 15/41 (37%) 12/41 (29%)
Low 31/41 (76%) 17/41 (42%) 1/41 (2%) 8/41 (20%) 9/41 (22%) 16/41 (39%)
Table 4
Judgments (by minga participation category) about Altruist versus high beneWt/high work
Minga participation category Favored Altruist Favored high beneWt/high work Tied (could not decide)
Respected more Punished less Respected more Punished less Respect Punish
High 8/11 (73%) 6/11 (55%) 3/11 (27%) 0/11 (0%) 0/11 (0%) 5/11 (45%)
Medium 12/41 (29%) 8/41 (20%) 13/41 (32%) 11/41 (27%) 16/41 (39%) 22/41 (54%)
Low 2/41 (5%) 2/41 (5%) 29/41 (71%) 23/41 (56%) 10/41 (24%) 16/41 (39%)
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These results suggested that the relationship between Par-
ticipation and Pro-cooperation was not just a sex eVect.
The correlation between Participation and Pro-coop-
eration-beneWt existed not only because high-participa-
tion subjects tended to favor lower-beneWters, but also
because low-participation subjects tended to favor
higher-beneWters. Tables 3 and 4 display the judgments
made by subjects in each of three minga participation
categories, about the two pairs of equal-contributors/
unequal-beneWters. These tables show that high-partici-
pation subjects tended to disfavor Freerider and favor
Altruist, low-participation (i.e., female) subjects tended
to favor Freerider and disfavor Altruist, and medium-
participation subjects fell between these two extremes.
DiVerences among the three participation categories
became still clearer when “tie” responses were omitted
from the analysis (Figs. 5, 6).
Binomial tests on Fig. 5 data indicated that low-par-
ticipators respected Freerider more than Low beneWt/
low work (p < .01), high-participators respected Low
beneWt/low work more than Freerider (p < .05), and
medium-participators respected neither worker more
(p D .85); further, high-participators punished Freerider
more than Low beneWt/low work (p < .01), medium-par-
ticipators punished Freerider marginally more than Low
beneWt/low work (p D .06), and low-participators pun-
ished Low beneWt/low work marginally more than Free-
rider (p D .11). Mann–Whitney U tests on Fig. 5 data
indicated that compared to low-participators, both high-
and medium-participators respected Freerider less
(p < .01), and that compared to medium-participators,
high-participators respected Freerider marginally less
(p D .08); further, compared to low-participators, both
high- and medium-participators punished Freerider
more (p < .01), but compared to medium-participators,
high-participators did not punish Freerider more
(p D .25).
Binomial tests on Fig. 6 data indicated that low-par-
ticipators respected Altruist less than High beneWt/high
work (p < .01), while medium- and high-participators
respected neither worker more (p D 1.00 and 0.23, respec-
tively); further, low-participators punished Altruist more
than High beneWt/high work and high-participators pun-
ished High beneWt/high work more than Altruist (p < .01
and .05, respectively), while medium-participators pun-
ished neither worker more (p D .65). Mann–Whitney U
tests on Fig. 6 data indicated that compared to low-par-
ticipators, both high- and medium-participators
respected Altruist more (p < .01), but compared to
medium-participators, high-participators were not sig-
niWcantly more likely to respect Altruist (p D .19); fur-
ther, compared to low-participators, both high- and
medium-participators punished Altruist less (p < .01),
and compared to medium-participators, high-participa-
tors punished Altruist less (p < .05).
Discussion
Results of the study suggested three main ways in
which Shuar judgments about worker behavior are
shaped by information about a worker’s degree of con-
tribution to, and beneWt from, a minga. First, when judg-
ing between unequally-contributing workers, all
subjects—regardless of age, sex, or minga participation
frequency—tended to judge the higher-contributor more
positively. Second, when judging between equally-con-
tributing unequally-beneWting workers, male subjects
who more frequently participated in mingas were more
likely to favor altruists and disfavor freeriders. Third,
when judging between equally-contributing unequally-
beneWting workers, subjects who were female and therefore
infrequent minga participants, tended to favor freeriders
while disfavoring altruists. Each of these three results
will be discussed in turn.
First Wnding: All subjects tended to favor higher-con-
tributors, when judging between unequal-contributors.
When subjects judged worker behavior, information
about the worker’s contribution seemed more salient
Fig. 5. Percent of subjects from each minga participation category who
favored Freerider over Low beneWt/low work (ties omitted). Lower-
participation subjects judged Freerider more favorably.
Fig. 6. Percent of subjects from each minga participation category who
favored Altruist over High beneWt/high work (ties omitted). Higher-
participation subjects judged Altruist more favorably.
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than information about the worker’s beneWt, and higher
contributors were judged more positively, regardless of
how much they beneWted. This pattern of basing judg-
ments on contribution level is highly consistent with the
ways in which subjects make judgments in experimental
collective actions (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ostrom et al.,
1992), and with existing qualitative accounts of attitudes
towards cooperators and freeriders in small-scale socie-
ties (Ostrom, 1990). The tendency of subjects to favor
higher contributors probably reXects the Shuar policy,
noted above, that regards all adult villagers as being
equally responsible for contributing to general mingas.
This policy makes sense in light of the fact that these
mingas are usually eVorts to produce public goods that
are considered to be accessible to all villagers. However,
an unusual feature of the minga scenario used in this
experiment was that it was explicitly portrayed as bene-
Wting some villagers more directly than others. This
manipulation was necessary in order to measure judg-
ments about diVerences in degree of beneWt, but it pre-
sented subjects with a somewhat novel problem: how to
assess cooperativeness in a minga that explicitly beneWts
some residents more than others. Nevertheless, few sub-
jects wavered from the policy that all residents should
contribute equally; in eVect, therefore, subjects often
judged that workers should subsidize the well-being of
their neighbors.
Why did subjects tend to look favorably on such
neighbor subsidization? Part of the explanation might
be the fact that, as noted above, Shuar villages contain
large numbers of close genetic kin, and kin altruism
(Hamilton, 1964) might raise expectations about the
degree of within-village cooperation. However, kin
altruism should be directed speciWcally at one’s close
kin, and not indiscriminately at one’s village as a
whole, so it is not a very precise explanation for the
expectation of neighbor subsidization. An alternative
explanation is that the Shuar assume that ultimately,
over the course of repeated mingas, the distribution of
minga beneWts will even out among all villagers: if X
works for X’s neighbors this time, X’s neighbors may
work for X next time. Work eVort in mingas may thus
be a form of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), or of
“greenbeard” reciprocity combining the eVects of posi-
tive assortment and reciprocal altruism (Price, 2006).
As long as the reciprocity system is not unfairly skewed
such that mingas routinely beneWt some villagers more
than others, then villagers should be able to give in the
conWdence that they will later receive. In the scenario
presented to subjects, extent of beneWt depended on
whether workers happened to live next to the river, and
in Shuar villages, the extent to which a family’s dwell-
ing is located near a river does not in itself indicate
anything in particular about the family’s social status,
degree of kin relatedness to village co-residents, or any
other form of general social advantage. If subjects
assumed that the minga’s unequal beneWt distribution
was the result of an arbitrary factor (an insuYcient
supply of pipes), and did not assume that mingas in this
village routinely advantaged one group over another,
then they may have seen no reason for lesser-beneWting
workers to withhold contributions: the beneWts of ran-
dom chance, unlike those of unfair design, should
become equally distributed among all villagers over
time.
Second Wnding: Subjects who participated in more min-
gas were more likely to favor altruists and disfavor free-
riders, when judging between pairs of equally-contributing,
unequally-beneWting workers. More-frequent minga par-
ticipants were more likely to make pro-cooperation
judgments, even after controlling for subject sex. How-
ever, this increased likelihood was evident only when
subjects were evaluating pairs of equally-contributing,
unequally-beneWting workers. The evolutionary theory
presented above predicts that both cooperators and free-
riders should favor cooperators, but that cooperators
should be especially likely to do so, because cooperators
should be relatively interested in avoiding exploitation
by, and in being punitive towards, freeriders. This pre-
diction was supported to some extent, although it is not
immediately clear why the relationship between partici-
pation and pro-cooperativeness showed up only with
regard to judgments about equally-contributing,
unequally-beneWting workers. It may be that because
assessment of cooperativeness is based primarily on
information about contribution, the task of detecting
freeriders and cooperators becomes more diYcult when
controlling for contribution. The cañicultores, as fre-
quent team cooperators, may be primed to judge worker
behavior in a more discriminating way, and be more sen-
sitive to secondary cues of cooperativeness such as
degree of beneWt. In other words, some kind of environ-
mental information, related to the experiences of belong-
ing to the cañicultores association and/or of
participating in their mingas, may activate a psychology
of social judgment that makes the cañicultores more
likely to base their judgments on teamwork-relevant cri-
teria. In support of this view, evidence does suggest that
information about one’s social context can aVect one’s
psychological disposition in cooperative tasks. For
example, subjects who have been cued to adopt a posi-
tion of high social rank seem relatively tolerant of free-
riding by others (Fiddick & Cummins, in press), and
group members cooperate more when they perceive that
the goal of this cooperation is to compete with an out-
group (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994). However, it is
also important to consider that the increased pro-coop-
erativeness of the cañicultores may in fact be a cause,
rather than an eVect, of frequent minga participation
(see below).
Third Wnding: Subjects who were females and therefore
infrequent minga participants tended to favor freeriders
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and disfavor altruists, when judging between equal-con-
tributors/unequal-beneWters. Given the apparent relation-
ship between pro-cooperativeness and minga
participation, the tendency of Shuar females to make
judgments that were the opposite of those of the cañi-
cultores may be interpretable as follows. Shuar females
rarely participate in mingas, which suggests that they
should also be less likely to judge workers in terms of
teamwork-relevant attributes. Therefore they may
default to assessing workers in terms of their desirability
as allies and/or mates, and focus on their ability to pro-
cure resources. Indeed, many female subjects were asked,
after completing the experiment, why they had favored
Freerider and disfavored Altruist, and all responded that
it was because Freerider had more water, and Altruist
had less. Apparently, Shuar women tended to regard
Freerider as just a superior resource procurer (and per-
haps as a relatively eYcient one, who could acquire
many resources without investing much time and eVort),
and Altruist as an inferior, and perhaps ineYcient,
resource procurer.
If female Shuar subjects were expressing a preference
for males with more resources, then their responses
would be highly consistent with cross-cultural data
about female mate preferences. In the vast variety of cul-
tures in which human mate preferences have been stud-
ied, females are consistently more likely than males to
rank access to resources as an important mate attribute.
As Buss and Schmidt (1993) point out, this universal
asymmetry is consistent with the theory that in the evo-
lutionary past, acquiring a resource-wealthy mate was
relatively more important to female Wtness than to male
Wtness. However, note that while a preference for
resource-wealthy men might incline Shuar women to
sometimes look negatively upon altruistic behavior in a
minga, it does not suggest that these women look nega-
tively upon cooperative resource-sharing in general;
indeed, it suggests that they look favorably upon the
possibility that a worker might share his resources
with her.
Implications of these results for organizational behav-
ior researchers. The most unambiguous result of the
above study, and the one that is most clearly consistent
with data about group cooperation in many industrial-
ized societies (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Falk et al., 2005;
Masclet et al., 2003; Yamagishi, 1986), is that when
workers to a team project are judged based on contribu-
tion level, higher-contributors are judged more posi-
tively and lower-contributors are judged more
negatively. The evolutionary theory discussed above pre-
sents plausible reasons to expect that Homo sapiens
should be psychologically adapted to judge group mem-
bers in these ways, and therefore that humans from all
cultures, even cultures that are vastly diVerent from one
another in some respects, should display such judgments.
The above study was conducted in a small-scale hunter-
horticultural culture that is in fundamental respects
quite diVerent from industrialized cultures, so the simi-
larity of Shuar judgments to those of members of indus-
trialized societies provides some support for this
evolutionary view. The Shuar of course represent only
one non-industrialized culture, and more data are
needed before any Wrm conclusions can be drawn about
the psychological universality of such social judgments.
However as noted above, qualitative studies conducted
in small-scale societies have provided results that seem
basically consistent with these Shuar data (Erasmus,
1977; Ostrom, 1990), and if further studies continue to
support the universality of such judgments, then it
would be useful for organizational behavior researchers
to consider that when they are conducting research in
any cultural context, regardless of the culture’s level of
industrial development, they can reasonably expect
for group members to judge high- and low-contributing
co-members positively and negatively, respectively.
The prediction that workers will be judged based on
their beneWt level has been relatively under-studied in
industrialized societies, compared to the prediction that
workers will be judged based on contribution level. Nev-
ertheless, this prediction has received some conWrmation
in previous studies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Sugiyama
et al., 2002), and received an additional amount of quali-
Wed support in the above study. If members of coopera-
tive groups do tend to judge each other based on level of
beneWt from a group-produced resource, then knowledge
about this eVect would help organizational behavior
researchers to understand the psychological and behav-
ioral dynamics of many types of cooperative interactions
that are common in industrialized societies, particularly
interactions which produce semi-public goods. For
example, in Western societies, all citizens of the same
income level are sometimes expected to contribute
equally to school bonds, even though these bonds should
beneWt parents of school-age children more directly than
other citizens. The theory presented above would predict
that in this situation, citizens who failed to contribute
would be judged more negatively if they were parents of
school-age children than if they were not.
The prediction that subjects who more frequently
cooperate will be more likely to favor cooperators and
disfavor freeriders has also been conWrmed in previous
studies (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Price, 2005; Price et al.,
2002; Shinada et al., 2004), and received some support in
the above study. If more cooperative members are rela-
tively judgmental about the extent of cooperative behav-
ior exhibited by co-members, then knowledge of this
eVect could be applied in useful ways. For example, one
might attempt to improve morale on a work team by
expelling ‘negative’ members who hold unfavorable
opinions of co-members. However, the above study sug-
gests that such a remedy could be disastrous: if the nega-
tive judgments are directed towards low cooperators,
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than negative members may also be the most coopera-
tive members, and therefore the last members that one
would want to expel.
Finally, with regard to the relationship between
subject sex and judgments about equal-contributors/
unequal-beneWters, additional research is needed in
order to determine whether this relationship is best
explained in terms of sex diVerences, as opposed to
diVerences in team participation or some other vari-
able. Sex diVerences in social judgments was not a pre-
diction of this study, and it is not clear whether female
subjects’ tendency to favor freeriders and disfavor
altruists was related to their perception of workers as
team cooperators, or as potential allies/mates. A
female preference for resource-wealthy males would
be consistent with the cross-cultural mate preference
literature (Buss & Schmidt, 1993), and there do appear
to be some diVerences with regard to how males and
females judge the behavior of cooperative partners.
For example, compared to females, males appear both
to experience more pleasure and less empathy when
seeing non-cooperators punished (Singer et al., 2006),
and also to punish non-cooperators more ‘on princi-
ple’, that is, with less concern for the economic impact
that such punishment will have on themselves (Eckel
& Grossman, 1996). DiVerences with regard to how
male and female team members evaluate the coopera-
tiveness of co-members could have important implica-
tions for how organizational behavior researchers
understand the psychology of team cooperation, but
more research is needed to investigate such diVer-
ences, and while the Wndings of the study presented
above may be provocative, they are certainly not con-
clusive.
Limitations. Several limitations of the above study
should be acknowledged. First, while the study sug-
gested that more-frequent minga participants were
more pro-altruist and anti-freerider, an important lim-
itation on interpreting this Wnding was placed by the
fact that all females, and no males, were low-participa-
tion, which resulted in sex and participation being
highly confounded. This limitation was circumvented
by omitting females from the sample, and then com-
paring medium- and high-participation males, an
analysis which indicated that pro-altruist and anti-
freerider judgments were indeed related to participa-
tion, and not just to a sex eVect. This result suggested
that the correlation between being female, and the ten-
dency to make pro-freerider and anti-altruist judg-
ments, was to some extent due to the fact that females
are low-participation; however, this result did not
address the issue of whether this correlation could also
have been bolstered by a sex eVect. In order to resolve
this question, a sample would be needed from a society
in which females and males both routinely cooperated
on work teams.
A second limitation was related to the assumption
that it was minga participation itself that caused the
cañicultores to regard cooperators relatively favorably.
The variable of minga participation was measured
somewhat crudely, with groups of subjects being classi-
Wed as high-, medium-, or low-participation. While it
was clear both that the cañicultores participated in
more mingas than typical Shuar men, and also that typ-
ical Shuar men participated in more mingas than Shuar
women, the variable of minga participation would ide-
ally have been measured more precisely, on an individ-
ual-by-individual basis. Further, while it was assumed
that inconsistencies in social judgments between cañi-
cultores and other subjects were due to the cañicult-
ores’ increased minga participation, these
inconsistencies may have been due to some other sys-
tematic diVerence between cañicultores and others. Age
was considered above as one such diVerence, because
the cañicultores tended to be older than other subjects,
but was found to explain no unique variance in atti-
tudes towards cooperators. Another intriguing possi-
bility that was more diYcult to address in this study
was that the increased pro-cooperativeness of the cañi-
cultores was actually a cause, rather than an eVect, of
frequent minga participation. Membership in the cañi-
cultores could be an outcome of having pro-coopera-
tion attitudes, if teamwork-oriented individuals were
more likely to join the cañicultores. Future research
will need to focus more closely on whether engagement
in cooperation actually activates the expression of
pro-cooperation judgments, or whether people who
make these judgments are more likely to engage in
cooperation.
A third limitation was related to the fact that only a
single vignette, the river minga scenario, was used to
assess judgments about cooperators and freeriders.
While there is no reason to think that this type of sce-
nario should be particularly likely to evoke biased sub-
ject responses, the use of more than one kind of vignette
in the study would have decreased the likelihood of such
bias, and so would have been preferable.
Conclusion
Overall, results of the study were largely consistent
with the predictions that all subjects would tend to make
pro-cooperation judgments, and that more-frequent
minga participants would be especially likely to make
these judgments. However, these results oVered two
unexpected twists. First, while degree of minga participa-
tion did correlate positively with pro-cooperativeness
when comparing equal-contributors/unequal-beneWters,
it did not do so with regard to comparisons of unequal-
contributors: all subjects, regardless of participation
level, were overwhelmingly likely to favor higher
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contributors in the latter type of comparisons. Second,
low-participation subjects (females) tended to make
anti-cooperation judgments when comparing equal-con-
tributors/unequal-beneWters.
More cross-cultural testing is required before Wrm
conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which the
above results illuminate human cognitive adaptations
for participation in collective actions for the production
of public- or semi-public goods. The fact that there is
much to learn about this topic is understandable, given
that researchers are just beginning the systematic data
collection that is needed in order to rigorously investi-
gate the ways in which humans may be adapted for, and
predisposed towards, cooperative behavior. This investi-
gation will require eVorts to illuminate the psychological
substrate underlying human behavior in group actions
cross-culturally, and the above study is intended as one
such eVort. The more we know about how humans are
predisposed to cooperate, the more we can use this
knowledge in order to promote cooperation in any kind
of cultural context, by designing social and organiza-
tional institutions that utilize the potential of these coop-
erative predispositions.
Appendix A. English translation of experimental scenario
Imagine that a community is going to have a minga to
build a system of pipes that will bring running water up
to the houses of the people in the community. But, there
are only enough pipes to bring water to half of the com-
munity. Only the houses that are closest to the river are
within reach of the pipes. [SHOW PICTURE]. This pic-
ture demonstrates what the pipe system will look like
after the minga is Wnished. The river is drawn in blue, the
pipes in red, and the houses in black. So, only half of the
community will receive running water as the result of
this minga. That is, only half of the community will ben-
eWt directly as the result of this minga.
A lot of hard work is involved in this minga, so the
minga will last 2 days. In order to complete this minga in
2 days, the help of all socios in the community is needed.
Imagine that only the Wrst day of the minga has been
completed. The Wrst day of the minga lasted 9 h. Some of
the citizens (socios) in the community worked all day in
this minga, but other citizens worked for fewer hours.
I am going to show you pictures of citizens who par-
ticipated in the Wrst day of the minga, along with two
pieces of information about each of these people: (1)
whether or not they will receive improved access to
water as the result of this minga, that is, how much they
will beneWt as the result of the minga, and (2) how much
they have sacriWced in the minga, that is, how many
hours they worked in the Wrst day of the minga.
The pail of water in each picture represents the extent
to which each person will beneWt as the result of the
minga. [SHOW PICTURE]. For example, this person
lives close to the river, in reach of the pipe system that
will be constructed in the minga. So, he will receive a lot
of running water as the result of the minga. That is why
there is a picture of a full pail of water here. This full pail
of water represents that this man will beneWt a lot as a
result of this minga. [SHOW PICTURE]. This person,
however, will not beneWt much from the minga, because
he lives far from the river, too far for the pipes to reach.
That is why there is a picture of an almost-empty pail of
water here. This almost-empty pail of water represents
that this man will not beneWt much as a result of this
minga.
The circle in each picture represents how many
hours each person has worked in the minga so far.
[SHOW PICTURE]. For example, this person worked
for the entire Wrst day of the minga—he worked for
nine hours. That is why 3/4 of the circle is Wlled in, and
why there is a number “9” drawn next to the circle;
this represents that the person worked for 9h in the
minga. [SHOW PICTURE]. This person, however, has
worked for only 3 h in the minga so far. That is why
only 1/4 of the circle is Wlled in, and why there is a
number “3” drawn next to the circle; this represents
that the person has worked for only 3 h in the minga.
[MAKE SURE SYMBOL MEANINGS ARE
UNDERSTOOD].
Now, I am going to show you pictures of 2 of the
minga participants, and tell you how much they will ben-
eWt as the result of the minga, and how long they have
worked in the minga so far. Then I will ask you:
1. Which one of the people deserves more respect, based
on his participation in the minga?
2. If you were the leader of this community, and you
could decide whether citizens should be punished
based on their participation in the minga, which of
these people would you think should be punished?
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